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Topic 10: ONGC Mumbai High Accident (July 27, 2005 @ West Coast of India)

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

Mumbai High Fire

The Mumbai High Field was discovered in 1974 and is located in the Arabian Sea. The field is divided into two blocks, North and South. It had the capacity of 180,000 barresls per day. It is operated by state owned Oil and Natural Gas Corp. (ONGC), and is protected by one private company and Indian Navy.  

On July 27,2005, 160km West of Mumbai Cost (India), 11 people were killed & 11 missing. 362 people were rescued by Offshore Vessel, Helicopters, Indian Navy and Coast Guards. The fire was triggered when a vessel collided with one of the four platforms. The platform was destroyed within 2 hours of fire. The property loss faced by ONGC is 300Million USD. In the acciddent one was the Multi Purpose Support Vessel (MPSV)  caught fire and later sunk on August 1, 2005,12 Nautical mile from the coast. 

 In order to control the further loss and hinderance to environment, the subsurface safety valves were closed.

Comments

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

In a media talk ONGC talks about there internal Health and Safety as follows:

  1. It is effective and vibrant system Top management is committed
    for maintaining the HSE standards
  2. HSE Committee board members include people from ONGC and Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
  3. A dedicated HSE  website is maintained by HSE to make employees aware
  4. ONGC runs Institute of Petroleum Safety Health and Environment Management [IPSHEM] which deals with all HSE trainings

In my opinion: IPSHEM is a very far fetched effort made by ONGC. These sort of institutes are not popular effort in Global Industry. The presence of  experts from industry in HSE Committee assures that ministry and safety norms are effectively forced.

As Proclaimed by Oil and Natural Gas Corp. India, their HSE Policy is as follows: 

  1. Committed to maintain the highest standard of Occupational Health Safety and Environment Protection
  2. We shall comply all applicable codes and requirements to promote  Occupational Health Safety and Environment Protection
  3. We shall remain alert, occupied and ready to respond to emergencies.
  4. Take all necessary actions to protect the integrity of the system in order to avoid accidental release of hazardous substances.
  5. We shall enhance awareness and involvement in promotion of occupational health safety and environment protection where ever we work.

Reference:

[1]. http://www.ongcindia.com/hse.asp, ONGC Health, Safety and Environment web page.

Elvis.E.Osung's picture

The raging fire that gutted an Oil and Natural Gas Corporation oil-drilling platform in the Bombay High oilfield area was caused when an ONGC vessel -- MSV Samudra Suraksha -- sent to pick up a sick worker on the oil rig collided with the giant platform, said ONGC Chairman and Managing Director Subir Raha on Thursday.

It was earlier believed that a multipurpose support vessel docked nearby crashed into the platform due to high tide and choppy seas.

"The accident took place at 4.05 pm on Wednesday when the ONGC vessel approached the process platform BHN (Bombay High North) to transfer an ill person to the platform where medical facilities are available," he said.

Raha said after the medical evacuation was completed, the vessel for some reasons, which are yet to be established, apparently lost control and collided with the process platform, resulting in the fire. This mishap resulted in serious oil leakage, engulfing the platform and the vessel in a major inferno, he said.

 http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jul/28ongc3.htm

 offshore facilities and installations are exposed to a whole range of hazards. The likelihood of collision of vessells to an oil platform poses a significant risk to an offshore installation.


The accident statistics shows that the majority (66%) of ship collision with installations involves supply vessells.


http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/otopdf/1999/oto99052.pdf

 its important, considerations are focused on safe measures towards preventing collision of vessells to offshore Installations.

 

JOHN BOSCO ALIGANYIRA's picture


Discussion Topic 10: ONGC Mumbai High Accident
(July 27, 2005 @ West Coast of India)


The
Mumbai High North fire that resulted in 22 fatalities  was  due
to a number of factors. First and foremost, due to heavy winds and high tide,
the Multi-Purpose Support Vessel ‘MSV’ lost control and collided with a riser
which broke and crude oil started leaking and caught fire resulting in an
explosion of the entire platform. Poor weather also disrupted communication
thus  hindering rescue helicopters. Even
though some ships were on their way to the rig at the time the incidence
happened , poor visibility and the hostile weather conditions also made the
rescue operations more challenging.


I
strongly believe that  considerations for
the bad weather should have been looked at, the Safety Engineers could have predicted
the bad weather and advised the MSV clue not to approach the platform. The
vessel could have remained stand still 
in the sea instead of moving much closure to the  Mumbai High North platform. In my  own opinion, the Mumbai High North platform  incidence should highly be blamed on human
errors i.e negligence of the health and safety team  otherwise, it should have been avoided if
proper safety procedures had been followed. Age of the platform/riser  could also have contributed to the easy  collapse/breakage  because the plat form  is said to have been 30 years old and most of
such platforms are designed to last about 20 years.


The
Mumbai High Field was divided into the north and south blocks comprising of  four offshore platforms that were interconnected
by bridges, which led to congestion and interference with sailing ships, with
the poor visibility and hostile weather conditions, it was very possible for
the clue on the MSV  to collide with any
of the four platforms.


The
 seven storey  Mumbai High North Platform  also had five 
gas export risers and ten  fluid
import risers situated outside  the  platform jacket .The risers on the platform
were so close to one another  with hardly
no fire  escape passages/routes  in that a fire outbreak on one of the risers
destroyed the entire platform. Such considerations should have been done during
the design phase, this clearly shows that there were no proper fire safety
procedures in place.


Regards,


John
Bosco Aliganyira


Msc.Oil
and Gas Engineering


References:


1.http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/project/research/structures/strucfire/CaseStudy/HistoricFires/Other/default.htm


2.http://home.versatel.nl/the_sims/rig/mhn.htm


3.http://www.rigsworld.com/Offshore-Accidents.htm











4. Offshore safety management
implementing a SEMS program
 by Ian S. Sutton , 2012





a.bhardwaj.12's picture

The course of Events which occured as inquired by HSE Streve Walker (HSE Offshore Division)

1.  The affected complex was designed to import well fluids from 11 wellhead NUI, and exports oil to beach as well as gas for gas lift operations.

2. Platform/field operated by Oil and Natural Gas Corp., the nationalised oil company.

3. At the time of the accident, a jack-up Noble Charlie Yester (NYC) was working on NA Platform.

4. The wather at the time was monsoon

5.  Fire occurred on 27 July 2005, a multi purpose support vessel (MSV), Samundra Suraksha, 100 meter long, hit one of the MHN platform riser

6. Vessel was owned by ONGC but operated and maintained by another nationalised company, the Shipping Company of India (SCI)

7. Vessel working elsewhere in the field, supporting saturation diving operations.Cook cut off the tips of two fingers, and transfer sought to MHN complex for medical treatment.

8. Monsoon meanth that no helicopter were available, so the vessel alongside MHN to affect a man-riding basket transfer.

9.  Leeward crane on MHN was not working,so vessel came onto the windward side (wind 35 knots,swell 5 meters,sea current 3 knots)

10. Problem with azimuth thrusters came alongside under manual (joy stick) control in emergency mode, stem first. The casualty was transfered off the deck by crane.

11. The vessel experienced a strong heave, and the helideck struck the risers (export gas lift)

12 The resulting leak ignited very quickly afterwards. The resulting fire engulfed virtually all of MHN and MHF,with NA and the Noble rig severely affected by heat radiation.

Reference:  HSE Offshore Division. Reported by Mr. Steve Walker (HSE Operations Manager)

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

The Mumbai High North Complex consists of 4 bridge-linked platforms

1. NA is a small wellhead platform,circa 1976 (first offshore well in India)

2. MHF is residential (1978)

3. MHN is a processing platform (1981)

4.MHW is a relatively recent additional process platform

The complex imports well fluids from 11 wellheads NUIs, and exports oil to beach as well as gas for gaslift operations. During accident Noble Charlie Yester (NYC) was working on NA.

 NYC was a Multi Purpose Support Vessel.

 

Reference: http://www.ongcindia.com/english.asp 

 

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

On the note of Platform life

1. Platform construction material and corrosion calculations allow the construction to work for 35 years or more in oceanic fatigue and vibrational conditions.The life improvement measures aretaken after every 5-8 years.

2. If my fellow friend would have understood the case, he wouldn't have commented with the life of the platform since the failure was due to high temperatures which occured because of fire. Even a brandnew structure would have failed in that environment.

The Mumbai High platform is guided by Indian Navy and 2 local agencies. No ship could enter the ocean area without permission and escort of Inidan Navy as per the Treaty for Indian Ocean activities. Hence it never occured to interfere with the sailing directions.

Also if you look it from a different perspective.The platform is located more than a hundered kms from the cost.I believe the sailing trajectory were getting recovered in that distance because of the presence of platform in between. Even no sea transport history or literature tells that the platform was a problem for ships sailing through the Indian Ocean.

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

The escape mission took place as:

1. 22 people died and 384 were rescued over next fifteen hours.

2. The fire significantly affected the rescue mission, with only two out of eight complex lifeboats able to be launched and only one out of ten life rafts.Similarly only half of the NCY's rescue craft could be launched.

3. Rescue was difficult because of monsoon conditions and harsh waters, so no helicopters took off from the land

4. Six divers in saturation chamber on vessel rescued 36 hours later.

 These were the HSE declarations to Mumbai HC.

In my opinion there was a design flaw because people were not able to take out the rescue boats and rafts because of the fire. It was unfortunate accident since 22 lifes were lost.

HSE and commissioning agency should have checked the design on the note of accessibility to the rescue boats and rafts in unfortunate times as were on July 27.

 [FYI: Pl check the font sizing and spacing before you post a comment.] 

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

The study of the Mumbai High Platform Accident by Oil Industry Safet Directorate (OISD) says that:

International Standards were followed to construct the platform and all safety and fire fighting equipment were installed on the facility. The personnel present on the platform were timely trained for Survival at sea, Helicopter Under Water Escape Training (HUET), First Aid & Fire Fighting

As per MHN OISD the factors which contributedto the incident were:

1. Adverse Weather conditions, weather side aproach 

2. Absence of joint procedures for vessel platform interface operations

3. manoeuvring misjudgement or operating error with possible machinery failure

4. Absence of interaction between an inexperienced OIM of MHN and over confident master of MSV

5. Operating alongside the platform with unprotected riser.

In my opinion 

 These factors added on at same occassion which lead to the misfortune. The major contributing error was the failure of machinery parts on Samudra Suraksha.

Reference:  Case report of "Oil Industry Safet Directorate"

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

Since Ministry of Petroleum reflected on the case and figured out that fault was due to lack of necessary measures of Health and Safety procedures hence Ministry of Petroleum, Government of India decided to give authority of offshore safety to Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD).

After this transition there were many developments made in the general attitude of Oil and Gas Industry in India. The capacity of the critical buildings dealing with Oil and Gas industry was increased. The general awareness and trainings were implimented in Oil and Gas companies in India. Safety management was strengthened in organizations. Also the regulatory mechanism was made mandatory to be approved by the pannel of Government of India. 

Agba A. Imbuo's picture

My colleague A. Bhardwaj has spoken extensively about the topic.But i will like to add here that in this incident, the severed cook's fingertips was considerd a major hazard compared to the riser.This is an improper threat judgement. Gas risers should be considered a major hazard because of the large volume of flammable fluid at high pressure they carry. Consider if a likely failure occurs resulting in a discharge below its topsides Emergency shut-down valves (ESDV), the effect will be catastrophic.
    Secondly,the risk assessment processes and subsequent controls did not control the threat to the risers. In particular, the procedures to manage ship impact were poor or poorly followed.
Global industry standards promote the practice of installing risers inside jacket structures. However, options for equivalent protection may be suitable if appropriate risk and hazard assessments are made. Those equivalent protection options may include:
• Properly designed fenders, addressing all credible threats
• Install risers within protective sleeves such as caissons or J tubes
• Locate risers away from platform loading zones
• Protect risers from hazards by location, barriers, or other means
• Avoid vessel operations near riser locations
• Provide subsea isolation valves (SSIVs) to limit consequences of riser damage.
This could have gone a long way avoiding or reducing the severity of this accident.Also

REFRENCES
1)http://www.archive.constantcontact.com/fs037/1102467289629/archive/11025...

 

AMBROSE AGBA

SUBSEA ENGR 51227054

ASOKHIA BENJAMIN MUYIWA's picture

The Mumbai High North (MHN) an oil platform in the Mumbai High Fields which
had being producing approximately 27 percent of the total 365,000 barrels per day of the Mumbai High
Fields (with other fields MHW, MHF, NA) got engulfed in a huge fire which
destroyed the entire platform within about two (2) hours.

                               

 

Figure:
The Mumbai High North platform is at the middle of the photo (Photo: ONGC)

THE
ACCIDENT

A Multipurpose Support Vessel (MSV) about
100m long whose mission was to rescue evacuate an injured worker on the MHN
collided with at least one of the gas risers of the MHN resulting in an oil
spill and consequent fire.

UNDESIRED
CONSEQUENCES

This historic accident resulted in

1.     A complete collapse of the platform and
subsequent abandoning.

2.     Death of 11 workers and another 11 missing
(implying 22 deaths indirectly).

3.     A total shut down of production activities
and definitely very huge income loss due the short down and losses to the
damage which included the entire platform, at least 8 live boats, 1 helicopter
on board and other very valuable assets.

REFERENCES

1.      
Ministry
of Petroleum and Natural Gas (India). (2005) Suo Moto statement in the LOK
Sabha by Petroleum Minister in respect of Fire Accident in Mumbai High North
Platform of ONGC

2.      
Subramanian,
T. S. and Katakam, A. (2005). “Disaster- A platform Lost”. Frontline, 22(17)

3.      
http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jul/28ongc3.htm

http://www.slideshare.net/MuzahidKhan/ongc-mumbai-high-accident

 

ASOKHIA BENJAMIN M.

51228516 

SUBSEA ENGINEERING

 

Henry Tan's picture

I cannot see your figure, where is your link?

ASOKHIA BENJAMIN MUYIWA's picture

Kindly click on the link below to view the image above (Don't know why it is not showing):

http://imechanica.org/node/13489

ASOKHIA BENJAMIN MUYIWA's picture

Safety issues resulting in the Mumbai High North seven (7) storey
platform accident could strongly include:

 

Figure: The Mumbai High North platform was
completely destroyed (Photo: ONGC)

1.      
VESSEL
(MSV) ISSUE:

On investigation, it was established that
the seaworthiness of the Multipurpose Support Vessel was strongly in doubt as
it was running on the emergency thrusters since the manual thrusters were not
working.

2.      
RISER
ISSUES:

·        
In
the design of the platform, questionable was the appropriateness of the riser
positions in respect to the platform’s structure and loading areas.

·        
Also
with design issue was a notice of the riser guards being inappropriate when
considering attending vessels.

·        
The
probability and risk of the risers getting damaged was noticed in the design of
the platform.

3.      
LACK
OF ROBUST RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS:

Inadequacies are observed in the Risk
assessment processes of the firm noticeable in:

·        
A
Multipurpose Service Vessel (MVS) moving close to the platform especially in a
very bad weather condition which contravenes the Collision Avoidance and
Protection measures in line with standard good practice and Observance of
safety for vessels approaching a platform.

·        
Insufficient
risk assessment of vulnerability of risers or pipelines to collision

REFERENCES

1.      
Ministry
of Petroleum and Natural Gas (India). (2005) Suo Moto statement in the LOK
Sabha by Petroleum Minister in respect of Fire Accident in Mumbai High North
Platform of ONGC.

2.      
Subramanian,
T. S. and Katakam, A. (2005). “Disaster- A platform Lost”. Frontline, 22(17)

3.      
http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jul/28ongc3.htm

http://www.slideshare.net/MuzahidKhan/ongc-mumbai-high-accident

 

 

ASOKHIA BENJAMIN M.

51228516 

SUBSEA ENGINEERING 

Henry Tan's picture

The above several posts are Continuous Posts.

Continuous posts are defined as those posts in the same blog submitted without interactions with others. All continuous posts will be combined and counted as 1 post only; that means only 1 mark be awarded to continuous posts.

Debate involves communications, and therefore you cannot keep commenting on the same topic just by yourself without discussions involved.

ASOKHIA BENJAMIN MUYIWA's picture

Consequent on my discussions with you and the new grading process, I am sure the continuous post rule does not apply; that you have assured.

ROHIT NAIR's picture

I would disagree to your findings about the sea
worthiness of the Multi-Purpose Support vessel Samudra Suraksha.

Firstly, the sea worthiness of MSV Samudra Suraksha
was never in doubt since all mandatory and classification certificates were
upto date.

Secondly, the ship was a DP (dynamically positioned)
Class 2 vessel, equipped with Variable Pitch mean propeller, 2 Azimuth
thrusters and 2 Tunnel thrusters with 100% redundancy. The nomenclature manual thruster
is inexistent.

And the ship was involved in saturation diving before
the accident took place and if there were any doubts about the sea worthiness
of the ship that would not be possible.

 

 

 

Rohit. C. Nair

Subsea Engineering

Student id- 51231896

 

 

 

 

 

ASOKHIA BENJAMIN MUYIWA's picture

Relevant
Management, safety and Reliability issues observed on investigation of the
accident include:

1.       INSUFFICIENTLY IMPLIMENTED COLLISION RISK
MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES:

Investigation
carried out showed insufficiencies in:

·        
The
competence of the Crew at handling the operation.

·        
Necessary
pre-entry checks, as related to the Guidelines of Ship/Installation Collision
Avoidance as contained in the UKOOA

·        
Suitability
of the vessel for the operation, and the vulnerability of the platform

·        
Questions
raised on quality of discussions and communication made on radios.

2.       POOR SAFETY CULTURE

A
very poor organizational safety culture can be implied as:

·        
Standard
operating policies were not adhered to in operations.

·        
Serious
questions were raised on the reliability and Safety certification of the platform,
especially being that external agencies had given severe warnings on the risk
of the risers to rupture through collision or other means, but had not been
attended to by the management. This showed the management participation in
issues of safety as being merely adhoc.

·        
The
emergency evacuation and rescue efforts were adjudged inadequate with only 2
live boats out of 10 being used, some employees jumping off at heights up to
35ft. Bothering questions could include: were the live boats working, were the
employees conversant with the operation of the boats, were they well spread out
around the platform?

REFERENCES

1.       Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
(India). (2005) Suo Moto statement in the LOK Sabha by Petroleum Minister in
respect of Fire Accident in Mumbai High North Platform of ONGC.

2.       Subramanian, T. S. and Katakam, A. (2005).
“Disaster- A platform Lost”. Frontline, 22(17)

3.       http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jul/28ongc3.htm

http://www.slideshare.net/MuzahidKhan/ongc-mumbai-high-accident

 

 

 ASOKHIA BENJAMIN M.

51228516 

SUBSEA ENGINEERING

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

A major fire destroyed a key offshore oil drilling platform off the west coast of India on 27 July, killing 33 people. Reports said the platform, which produced 110,000 barrels per day, collapsed into the water and was completely destroyed during the fire. Oil and Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar said a nearby support vessel and an oil rig were also demolished by the blaze. The Bombay High North (BHN) Platform is owned by the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). Reports said the vessel, the MSV Samudra Suraksha, was also owned by ONGC and managed by the Shipping Corporation of India. Agence France Presse added that the ship was insured for US$60m. Noble Corporation confirmed its Noble Charlie Yester cantilever jackup rig was also involved in the fire. ONGC insured the platform for US$750m with a US$20m deductible, according to Indian Business Insight. The publication added that United India Insurance was the lead insurer for the platform and that ONGC’s assets were further reinsured up to 95% with General Insurance Corporation (GIC) and  the reinsurance market in London. According to The Economic Times, ONGC’s insurance coverage also included measures to cleanup pollution. In addition, ONGC can claim up to 25% of the insured value for removing the debris of its assets and a further 25% to recover the cost of search and rescue operations. It is not clear whether ONGC had insurance cover for loss of earnings due to the closure of the facility. Company sources have estimated that the overall insured loss figure will reach US$260m, according to Lloyd’s List. ONGC received an interim payment of US$173m from United India Insurance in September 2005, The Economic Times said. Insurers will settle the remaining part of the claim after scrutinising the damage. Around 350 workers were on the platform at the time of the blaze. Some survivors were treated for burns. Helicopters were deployed to evacuate personnel while the navy and coastguard also helped in the rescue operation. ONGC said it has started cleaning up the oil spill caused by the accident. The oil spill stretched up to 10 miles (16 kilometres), a company statement said. The destruction of the platform affected oil output. However, ONGC restored about 70% of the lost production by the first week of September.

 

Roots from: BBC News, Associated Press, Agence France Presse, Reuters News, Dow Jones International News, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Indian Business Insight, The Economic Times, Insurance Day, Lloyd’s List, Upstream, Indian Business Insight, Financial Express  

Andrew Allan's picture

In the observations made by the HSE following their inquiry into the Mumbai High incident [1], they note that the ignited riser release following ship impact resulted in flames engulfing both the processing and accommodation platforms. The wellhead platform and jack up rig on site at the time also suffered from the effects of thermal radiation.

These observations bring into question the inherent safety of the design and layout of the Mumbai High facilities.  In designing the compex of facilities, fire and explosion modelling should be used as a tool to determine the required separation distance between faciltiies such that in the event of an ignited release from one platfrom, escalation to adjacent platforms is extremely unlikely.

In this event it is clear that there was insufficient separation distance between the process platform and accommodation platform as following impact of the riser on the process platfrom, the accommodation and temporary refuge were engulfed in flames.  Impairment of the temporary refuge (and access to it) would have hindered escape and evacuation efforts as it is likely that personnel outwith the accommodation were unable to reach the TR.  The lifeboats adjacent to the TR were likely not useable due to high levels of thermal radiation, forcing personnel to attempt escape using a tertiary means such as ladder to sea or throw over the side liferaft.

Should the Mumbai High event have been envisaged during design of the facilities, a sufficient bridge length would have been designed such that the temporary refuge and lifeboats could not be impaired by fire events on the process platfrom.  This would have increased the likelihood of personnel on the accommodation platform surviving the initial event, mustering and evacuating via the lifeboats.

victor.adukwu's picture


 


The Mumbai High North platform is located in offshore India,
160km west of the Mumbai coast and was discovered in 1974. It has two
processing platform, one residential platform and a wellhead platform. The
complex import crude from eleven other satellite wellhead platforms and export
oil to shore via subsea pipelines, as well as processing gas for gas lift
operations. It is a seven storey platform with five gas export riser and ten
oil import risers situated at the outside of the platform jacket legs.


In July 27, 2005, a multipurpose support vessel collided
with the Mumbai High North platform, severing at least one gas riser and
causing a massive fire explosion which destroyed the platform within two hours.
Eleven deaths was recorded and eleven persons were declared missing. This
accident led to the complete collapse of the platform.


The following safety issues were raised after the incident
occurred:


·       
Serious doubt about the safety certification of
the Mumbai High North platform has been raised.


·       
Intervention of the senior management seem to be
just ad hoc


·       
Seaworthiness of the multipurpose support vessel
has been questioned as during the rescue mission it was found that the vessel
was working on emergency thrusters as the manual thrusters was not working


·       
Rescued efforts have also been questioned


·       
Standard operating practice was not followed


·       
There were enough warning from many agencies but
the management appeared remised without enquiring further into the risk of
riser ruptures.


·       
The vulnerability of the risers to any external
force


·       
The appropriateness of the riser guards in
relation to the design of attending vessels


·       
Risk management process was poor


 


Reference:


http://www.slideshare.net/MuzahidKhan/ongc-mumbai-high-accident


a.bhardwaj.12's picture

After the unfortunate accident, the cleanup operation was taken up for 10 nautical mile oil spill which resulted from fire.

The areas of investigation for the accident were directed as:

1. The adequacy of and failures within the risk control systems

2. The adequacy of collission avoidance practices and procedures

The core points of interest of investigation include the location and vulnerability of the risers in the jacket relative to platform loading zones. Some riser protection guards were in place just above sea level, but these were only suitable for smaller offshore vessels. Also under investigation in the quantity of riser contents likely to be discharged if a riser should fail below and emergency shutdown valve and the risk management process, including the vesselsuitability, the crew competence,communication and collision avoidance measures. 

The Bombay High field accounted for 40% of India's domestic production, of which the North Platform accounted for 25%. One month after the accident, production had been restored 60% of the pre-accident level. 

Giorgos Hadjieleftheriou's picture

Topic
10

 

The Mumbai accident occurred when a vessel collide with
the platform. A big fire has spread on the platform after the collision and because
of the bad weather conditions that where taking place on that day, the disaster
was difficult to be avoid. The result was 22 fatalities, loss of the MSV and
over $200 millions damage.  

The important about the accident are the safety
regulations improvements that took place in the oil and gas industry.

Regarding this accident there are some measurements taken:

·       
Fender installation

·       
Riser installation within the protective
sleeves

·       
Vessels should be operating far from the platform

·       
Sub-sea valves isolation

A better safety plan, managing any threats may have avoided
the accident. Because the accident has taken place in 1974, safety regulations weren't
so specialized. If the accident happened nowadays the accident would not bring
the same amount of damage.

http://www.wikipedia.org/

 

Omololu Oyebola's picture

The Mumbai High North Discovered in 1974, located 160km west of the Mumbai coast operated by the India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). The Mumbai High consisted of a processing complex, unmanned drilling platform, wellhead and residential platform all bridge connected.

The complex imported supplies from other well head platforms and exports oil to the shore using pipelines. On 27th July 2005 a multi-purpose support vessel (MSV), Samundra Surakha, 100m long collided with one of the gas riser. The vessel was mobilized to the platform because the crane on the vessel was not functional. 

The leakage in gas ignited immediately after, the resulting fire engulfed the platforms and also the rig. 22 people died and over 300 were rescued. 

Reports from the accidents showed that the incident vessel was dynamically positioned using azimuth thrusters but still moved to collide with the riser on the platform. Poor safety culture has been noticed prior to the incidence and sea worthiness of the MSV has been questioned, as during the rescue operation it was found that the vessels  was working on emergency thrusters rather than the manuals. 

Recommendations

Production companies should do a proper vessel inspection prior to her mobilization.

Vessel crew competence should be as important as the operation itself

Sources:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombay_High

http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/project/research/structures/strucfire/C...

ROHIT NAIR's picture

Everybody has talked a lot about how the incident happened, what
were the consequences and what should be done to improve the safety of
people
working offshore and also about the modifications to the design of the
structure and various other issues related to safety. But one thing
everybody
failed to discuss is the state of saturation divers, on board a listing
and potentially sinking MSV, who were
left alone under no supervision when the ship was abandoned. There was
nobody
onboard monitoring the environment (oxygen, carbon dioxide, humidit and
temperature) within the Deck Decompression Chamber (DDC) .  What happened to the divers and how were they
rescued???

 

 

Rohit. C. Nair

Subsea Engineering

Student id- 51231896

 

 

 

Bassey Kufre Peter's picture

 

 

 

 The Mumbai High field comprises 110 different wells platforms. It is located at about 160km West- North of Mumbai City in the Arabian Sea. It is the largest offshore field in India.

 

The Bombay High North (BHN) Platform which was strategically located in the North Part of Mumbai High field. The BHN Process Complex consist of NA - well cum process platform, NF – Trunk line riser cum process platform, BHN – main oil and gas processing platform and MNW – gas compressor-cum-water injection platform.

 

The major accident that took place at the BHN Process platform on the 27th July, 2007 was as a result of the impact of Multi-Purpose Support Vessel (MPSV) - “Samudra Suraksha” in the hostile monsoon weather during a medical evacuation resulted in devastating fire. This further resulted in the loss of 22 lives and complete damage to BHN Process Platform, damage to nearby  process platform – NF and moderate damage to the well-cum-process-plaform – NA and gas-compressor-cum-water injection platform – MNW.

 

The accident occurred due to poor safety culture and implementation of HSE policy, poor risk management and lack of regular maintenance of the platform by ONGC oil and gas.Other reasons that led to the accident are:

 

1. Poor riser integrity/protection and overhanging pipeline protection systems whose damage triggered the fire accident.

 

2. Poor/non implementation of collision avoidance and protection measures described in the UK Offshore Operator Association(UKOOA).

 

3. Inappropriate positioning of the risers in relation to the platform structure and loading zone.

 

4. Failure due to the discharge of the topside riser below its Emergency Shut Down Valve (ESDV).

 

5. Incompetency of the MPSV crew and poor communication.

 

In order to avoid similar occurrence the above mentioned points should be properly design for and appropriate design and HSE standards should be strickly adhered.

 

Reference:

1. Mitra, N. , Dileep, P. and Adesh K. (2008) ‘Revival of Mumbai High North- A case study’ ,

 

SPE Indian Oil and Gas Technical Conference and Exhibition, pp. 1-6. Mumbai, India, 4-6 March 2008. SPE Xplore (Online). Available at: http://www.onepetro.org/mslib/app/Preview.do?paperNumber=SPE-113699-MS&s... ( Accessed 1 November 2012)

 Bassey, Kufre Peter
M.Sc-Subsea Engineering-2012/2013
University of Aberdeen.

ID:51231017 

Ajay.Kale's picture

Ajay Kale

The Mumbai High North fire incident that resulted in 22 fatalities  was  due
many number of number of factors. First immidaite cuase was, collison of MSV (Multi-Purpose Support Vessel) with platform riser due to heavy winds and high sea tide.

After collison of MSV with rise ,the rise broke and crude oil started leaking and caught fire resulting in an explosion of the entire platform.
The Poor weather also contributed to this incident & hindred recuse effort from Indian Navy, Cost Guards, helicopter & offshore vessel.
I belive that there were poor safety escape procedure in place before incident.
The riser guards were designed to have impact of supply boat & not for MHV type vessel impact.The corrosion has also weaken the riser & couldn't withstand with the impact of collision.
The were no adequet emegency operating tools with thier disposal (Like helicopters, resuce boats etc) & because of this also causality increased.
Indian offshore industry is not big & have no.of shortages on many fronts. Like HSE regulation, legisalation, Offshore skilled workers ,lack of training for offshore workers.
Ignorance of compliance.( With such a poor weather why MSV allowed to sail near platform)
Finally culture of safety in the India also contributed in this incidence.

Etienne Gunter's picture

I want to make a general comment regarding the cause of the accident.


Several findings list all kinds of inadequacies regarding the design of the platform. These might be considered to be “secondary” causes, because up to the collision, everything has been working “fine”.  Once the platform is in operation, there is not much more that can be done to make it much safer. Then it is up to safe working practices and how you use that which is to your disposal.


I agree that there were serious shortcomings in the design, but the point I am trying to make is the following:
Rules and regulations cannot replace good and sound judgement. They are there to support good and sound judgement.
Given the nature of the situation, failed leeward crane of the platform, atrocious weather conditions and problems with the MSV’s azimuth thrusters , the transfer should never have been attempted in the 1st place!


It is not possible to conjure up a risk assessment plan that can address every conceivable combination of failures when assessing the situation. Yes, guidance must be given regarding practices and procedures, but ultimately it is good judgement, when appraising the situation that will prevail.

Etienne Gunter's picture

Furthermore, it is the lack of good judgement, that lets people ignore basic rules and regulations (design, manufacturing, operatoin etc.)

Abiaziem Davidson's picture

ONGC Mumbai High Accident which occurred on July 27, 2005 at west Coast of India was caused when an ONGC vessel (MSV Samudra Suraksha) sent to pick up a sick worker on the oil rig lost control of vessel after picking the sick work and collided with the oil drilling platform, resulting in fire. This resulted in severe oil leakage engulfing the platform and the vessel in a major inferno. 

The fire resulting from the collision was so high and could not be contained by both the workers on the platform and vessel and the situation forces all personnel onboard to abandon.There were three hundred and eighty-five personnel onboard when the accident happened and the death toll from this accident is put to ten workers and fourteen workers reported missing.

The major cause of this accident is high tide of the sea; this accident caused environment pollution of the aquatic life, lost of life, equipment, investment and production. 

Reference

http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jul/28ongc3.htm

ROHIT NAIR's picture

Firstly, the MSV Samudra Suraksha was not sent to pick up a sick
worker on the oilrig. One of the ship’s catering employees cut off the tip of
his finger and was being personnel transferred to the platform with the help of
basket transfer for medical assistance.

 

Secondly, it was a Process
Platform
with which the MSV collided and the collision resulted in the rupturing of the gas riser, which
resulted in the platform being engulfed in flame.

 

 

Rohit. C. Nair

Subsea Engineering

Student id- 51231896

ROHIT NAIR's picture

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ROHIT NAIR's picture

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Elvis.E.Osung's picture

Statistics have shown a high rate of collission of ships(supply,diving support,standby vessels e.t.c) to offshore facilities while some of this collissions are minimal, others like the ONGC are catastrophic with large antecedent loss of life and asset worth billions of pounds,the risk of collision is predicted to be a dominating risk for an offshore installation when compared with other risks like explosions, leakages, fires and falling objects. it is important to continously update and review the model for assessing the collission risks of an offshore installation to ensure appropriate technical and managerial actions are taken. some critical issues like minimum distance of approach of a supply vessel to an offshore facility should be reevaluated, the 500 metres zone is not enough barrier as terrible weather conditions can make the supply vessells to loose anchorage and move uncontrolled towards the platform resulting in a collision as was with the ONGC case.


http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/otopdf/1999/oto99052.pdf

http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1689121&fileOId=1765259

Oluwatadegbe Adesunloye Oyolola's picture

The Accident

A multi- purpose support vessel (MSV) 100m long, hit one of the MHN platform risers resulting in fire outbreak. Vessel owned by ONGC but operated and maintained by the ShippingCompany of India (SCI). Leeward crane on MHN was not working, so vessel came onto the windward side (wind 35 knots, swell 5 metres, and sea current 3
knots). Problems with azimuth thrusters – came alongside under manual (joy stick) control in emergency mode, stern first. The casualty was transferred off the deck by crane. The vessel experienced a strong heave, and the helideck struck the risers (export gas lift).The resulting leak ignited very quickly afterwards. The resulting fire engulfed virtually all of MHN and MHF, with NA and the Noble rig severely affected by heat radiation.

Rescue Operations

22 people died. 362 were rescued over next fifteen hours. The fire significantly affected rescue, with only two out of the eight complex lifeboats able to be launched.

Poor Safety Culture

Serious doubts have been raised on the safety certification of MHN. The MSV has been questioned as
during the rescue mission it was found that the vessel was working on emergency thrusters as the manual thrusters were not working. Standard operating practices were not followed. There was enough warning from external agencies but the management appeared remise without enquiring further into the risk of riser ruptures.

Aftermath

Incident reinforces the need for thorough risk assessment of the potential causes and consequences of riser damage. Development, implementation and maintenance of associated risk management measures put in place. Adoption of collision avoidance and protection
measures which at least meet current good practice as described in UKOOA. Arrangements ensuring that the risk management measures are effective and observed.

Reference:

http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jul/28ongc3.htm

http://home.versatel.nl/the_sims/rig/mhn.htm


 

Adesunloye-Oyolola O.

MSc Oil and Gas Engineering

ROHIT NAIR's picture

-

ROHIT NAIR's picture

I’ll describe the rescue procedure to the best of my knowledge:

·     
The hyperbaric rescue lifeboat located
on the port side of MSV Suraksha, was damaged in the fire preventing the rescue
of Saturation divers.

·     
The dive supervisor onboard MSV
Suraksha pressurized the chamber to 85 m since the depth of seabed was 82m and
it was emergency protocol to pressurize to a depth greater than the sea depth
since it prevents water from entering the chamber.

·     
The ship was abandoned due to
the fire and potential risk of sinking

·     
With every passing hour and in
the absence of monitoring and control of the chamber environment, the CO2 content
was increasing within the chamber and potentially putting the life of divers at
risk.

·     
There were two other
decompression chambers adjacent to the chambers in which the divers were
present. And in desperation the divers released pressure to other two chambers
bringing down the chamber pressure to that at 54m.

·     
Samudra Prabha was engaged in
fire fighting and rescue operations of the MSV Suraksha that was on fire.

·     
Once the fire was brought under
control after 10 hours the dive superintendent and dive supervisor from MSV,
boarded the MSV Suraksha to check on the divers. They made contact with the
divers and comforted them.

·     
Rescue team from MSV Prabha was
called in.

·     
They added extra sodasorb into
the saturation chamber, which is an absorbent of CO2 and other
acidic components from air.

·     
A fresh mix of oxygen and
helium was also released so that the divers could breath easy.

·     
The rescue team started the decompression
of chamber as per the normal decompression procedure.

·     
Dr. A C Kulkarni, is one of India’s most experienced diving medicine specialists was
brought on board the MSV Suraskha and under his supervision the decompression
rate was increased, still 30 hours were required for decompression.

·     
Since the risk of sinking was on the increase with every passing hour,
when there was 12 hours remaining for completing the decompression process, the
Doctor and the rescue team decided on aborting the decompression operation

·     
But by aborting saturation, the
pressure on the divers will have to be reduced to Zero atmospheric pressure in
less than 30 mins. They will then be transferred in a lifeboat to MSV Prabha
where they will be transferred to Prabha’s decompression chamber at a pressure
of 30 mtrs for a normal decompression procedure.

·     
But Abort Saturation has to be
carried out in less than 30 mins and the entire transfer operation as soon as
is possible.

·     
Thus the process was carried
out and the operation was a success and divers were rescued in a daredevil
operation.

I would like to add that the next day while the ship was being towed it sinked.

 

Rohit. C. Nair

Subsea Engineering

Student id- 51231896

 

 

 

Kyeyune Joseph's picture

The accident is one of the fatal events that ever happened in the offshore oil and gas industry of India. It was as a result of collision of a Multipurpose Support vessel (MSV) Samundra Suraksha and one of the platforms (BHN).  Incident was triggered when the vessel after making a rescue operation for an injured staff, experienced strong heaves due to monsoon winds and one of its helidecks hit a gas riser leading to loss of containment that eventually led to a fierce outbreak of fire. This soon engulfed the vessel, the BHN process platform and nearby platforms. Consequences of the disaster were high not only in terms of fatalities but also in property damage. The vessel and BHN platform were fully destroyed, serious damage to nearby process platform NF and moderate damage to process platforms NA and MNW. As a result, there was lost oil and gas production from the facilities. In terms of fatalities, 22 people lost their lives though 362 were saved [1]. Basing on the chronology of events, the following observations can be made:

The vessel had a maintenance problem as its crane on lee ward side was not functional. Thus it meant that it had to approach the platform from the opposite side leading to collision with the riser. Besides, its seaworthiness was also questionable.
The position of the riser on the process platform and the guards provided to them raises safety and reliability concerns. Thus in case of any collision, this was meant to lead to loss of containment. 
Position of the emergency shutdown valve (ESDV) on the riser was not properly planned out. This meant that in case of failure of the riser like in collision, huge quantities of gas would be released without control. Besides, there wasn’t any serious risk management plan for such an occurrence. This quantity ought to have been as low as possible by proper positioning of the ESDV. This wasn’t the case thus when damage occurred, huge quantities were released thus massive fire outbreak.
Adequacy of collision avoidance practice and procedures for the vessel crew is also questionable. Given the state of the sea at the time, they ought to have understood that getting so closer to the platform, chances were high that in case of waves the vessel could be forced into collision with the platform. Additionally, the role of the safety zone in relation to vessels approaching the installation seemed to have been violated.
However, it is important to note that despite the bad weather with no helicopter support from the land, with only two out of the eight complex lifeboats being launched and one out of ten life rafts being used together with one craft from NCY, only 22 fatalities were registered with 362 members being saved!

Reference
[1] Mitra, N.K., Bravo, C.E. & Kumar, A. 2008, "Revival of Mumbai High North - A Case Study", SPE Indian Oil and Gas Technical Conference and Exhibition. Society of Petroleum Engineers, Mumbai, India, 4-6 March 2008. SPE 113699, available at onepetro.

 

OKECHUKWU CHUKELU's picture

The Bombay High field accounted for
40% of India's domestic production, of which the North platform accounted for
one quarter. The first priority was relief and rescue operations. 
 Safety Management System and safety
awareness were strengthened in organisations. 
 The 15 wells that poured oil into Mumbai High North
platform (MHN) were looped to other platforms in the area. 
 A contingency plan was also put into place. Although
the loss of the platform immediately impacted 110,000 barrels per day of crude
production, 70 per cent of this production was restored just two weeks after
the accident, while the rest of the production was restored in four weeks.
  Given the intensity of the fire and the consequent damage,
the platform was abandoned according to a well-rehearsed drill used in offshore
operations.
 Even though, there were
not any long-lasting environmental damage after the accident, India moved
quickly to form a 30-member body of state and private entities tasked with
developing safety regulations and inspection procedures: the Ministry of
Petroleum and Natural Gas’ Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD). 
 The OISD requested assistance, specifically from
Minerals Management Service (MMS), in developing regulations and procedures.

 

In addition to the recommendations listed above, first
aid and basic medical treatment should be available within the MSV, as this
would have prohibited the chain of events that led to the fire.  All
of the lifeboats and life rafts should be prepared for use at anytime, so
regular maintenance checks should be carried out to ensure that they are in
working form.  Professionals should be trained to be competent by
safety training in events of failure and different weather conditions.  All
the professionals should be made aware of an evacuation plan during their
training for different failure scenarios and should be made aware of the
importance of maintaining a safety culture.  They should also be
taught the appropriate communication skills to assist them in coming to a
decision even where is a difference of opinion, safety interventions could be
adapted as part of the training. The MSV should incorporate an evacuation
plan independently so as to not depend on any other structure for any kind of
support. 

Ajay.Kale's picture

Ajay Kale

The Mumbai High North fire incident that resulted in 22 fatalities  was  due
many number of number of factors. First immidaite cuase was, collison of MSV (Multi-Purpose Support Vessel) with platform riser due to heavy winds and high sea tide.

After collison of MSV with rise ,the rise broke and crude oil started leaking and caught fire resulting in an explosion of the entire platform.
The Poor weather also contributed to this incident & hindred recuse effort from Indian Navy, Cost Guards, helicopter & offshore vessel.
I belive that there were poor safety escape procedure in place before incident.
The riser guards were designed to have impact of supply boat & not for MHV type vessel impact.The corrosion has also weaken the riser & couldn't withstand with the impact of collision.
The were no adequet emegency operating tools with thier disposal (Like helicopters, resuce boats etc) & because of this also causality increased.
Indian offshore industry is not big & have no.of shortages on many fronts. Like HSE regulation, legisalation, Offshore skilled workers ,lack of training for offshore workers.
Ignorance of compliance.( With such a poor weather why MSV allowed to sail near platform)
Finally culture of safety in the India also contributed in this incidence.

Maxwell Otobo's picture

The ONGC mumbai high accident was an unfortunate one that resulted in devastating fire which led to the complete damage of MHN platform (a 30 year old and 7 storey one) along with a helicopter positioned on it and it is rated as the 7th most expensive accident in the oil and gas industry costing about $195,000,000.

Event sequence = collision --> release ---> fire. It occurred during a medical evacuation (of a cook onboard the MSV vessel) from vessel to MHN platform for treatment.

The helideck on the multi-purpose support vessel hit one of the risers due to strong heave and caused the riser to rupture causing a leak which ignited soon after and lasted for 2 hours. 11 people died, 11 people were confirmed missing and 362 ppl were rescued. Also due to bad weather conditions, helicopters on land couldn't take off to assist with the rescuing of people offshore. The multipurpose vessel caught fire as well and sank four days after being towed away.

The safety issues of concern in this accident were; the risers position in relation to platform structure, the design of riser guards and the reason why the safety manager/engineer allowed allowed the vessel to approach platform/installations at such atrocious weather where a multi purpose support vessel should only engage an oil rig under normal weather conditions.

Although the vessel was a dynamically positioned one that could remain in one position on the sea with the aid of computer controlled thrusters, the reason why it went so close to the MHN platform, went out of control and hit the riser wasn't clear.

References

http://home.versatel.nl/the_sims/rig/i-expense.htm

http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/project/research/structures/strucfire/CaseStudy/HistoricFires/Other/default.htm

http://home.versatel.nl/the_sims/rig/mhn.htm

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

After the accident ONGC took some potential steps to assure the safety and developed the Environmental Management System based on ISO 14001 at each operating facility which was further integrated with Quality, Occupational Health and Safety Management System (QHSE MS). The organization process reports are continiously audited by Corporate/Sectoral HSE and is reviewed by top management to assure continual inprovement. 

The new, more precise Emergency Response Plan has been prepared at Installation level and there is Disaster Management Plan at Asset level as well. There have been periodic mock drills conducted for different emergency situations for enhancing effectiveness of response plan.  

a.bhardwaj.12's picture

To increase the safety ONGC developed an adequate resources to handle the oil spills upto 700 Tons. In order to control the higher amount of oil spills ONGC obtained membership of M/S OSRL. ONGC also prepared a Tier-I facility at Mumbai Port Trust for combating oil pollution. ONGC showed its environmental concers by providing protection for extensive mangrove plantation for marine environment protection in Gandhar area of Gujrat. Mangroves in itself are an ecosystem and harbour numerous species and also serve as breeding place for marine organisms. This step has proved that Indian National Oil and Gas companies are genuinely concerned for environmental protection not just to showcase their concers on Page 3, unlike other companies around the world. 

farman oladi's picture

Offshore Mumbai High North platform is located in 160 km west of the Mumbai coast. This steel structure was used for Oil and natural gas processing in seven stores and had 80,000 barrels per day capacity which had been operated by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) since 1974. A total of 384 personnel were on the MHN complex. The complex was formed by four platforms:

NA small wellhead platform built 1976;

MHF residential platform built 1978;

MHN processing platform built 1981;

MHW recent additional processing platform

On 27 July 2005, the cooker of multi-purpose support vessel cut off his fingers and vessel wanted to bring him for medical treatment to MHN by crane lift, but the computer-assisted crane had a problem. In that time, the stormy weather with high tide and heavy wind caused the vessel to lose control and heli-deck at the rear of vessel collided with gas export risers on the MHN platform. In a short time gas leaked and large amount of gas was released and caused explosion and destruction of the MHN jacket. 11 people lost their life and 11 others missing.

In my opinion, the main reason of this incident is lack of safety. First of all, why the MHN control room let the vessel to come near raisers in that weather. Also, why raisers didn’t have any protections or properly fire protection system at least to avoid expansion of this incident. Why they didn’t use platform’s manual cranes instead of computerized faulty crane.

http://home.versatel.nl/the_sims/rig/mhn.htm

http://www.rigsworld.com/Offshore-Accidents.htm

http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jul/28ongc3.htm

This accident was the most severe accident in the history of India. As a consequence, 12 people died and 13 people lost. In the meantime, the entire production platform, a multifunction support vessel, a helicopter were burnt which caused economic loss up to 2.3 billion dollars and one third loss in production rate of India. The cause analysis showed that at that moment, the great surge made impact on vessel operation whilst staff on board relied on the automatic positioning system thus misjudged the situation. And there lacked essential protection for the risers. The lessons learned from the accident include
it is supposed to develop dual methods instead of solely depending on automation
technology, the protection design shall be considered for platform risers and the shutdown system should be improved to ensure it could prevent the escalation of accident timely.

amaka.ikeaka's picture

On the 27th of July 2005, a multipurpose
support vessel (MSV) hit one of the MHN platform risers, resulting in a total
of 22 fatalities. In addition to what every one has said, I believe that this incident
reinforces the need for a thorough risk assessment to be carried out on the
potential causes and consequences of riser damage, as the one in place did not
control the threat to the risers. In addition, gas risers should always be
considered as hazardous due to the large volume of flammable fluid at high
pressure. Adequate collision avoidance and protection measures also need to be
adopted, as the procedures to manage the ship impacts were poorly executed.
Also there's need for a better design (with risers well protected inside the
jacket), one which would focus on managing the threats might have avoided this
accident

Reference

http://www.ircrisk.com/blognet/post/2009/05/26/2005-Mumbai-High-North-Pl...

 

Abiaziem Davidson's picture

ONGC Mumbai High Accident which occurred on July 27, 2005 at west Coast of India was caused when an ONGC vessel (MSV Samudra Suraksha) sent to pick up a sick worker on the oil rig lost control of vessel after picking the sick work and collided with the oil drilling platform, resulting in fire. This resulted in severe oil leakage engulfing the platform and the vessel in a major inferno.

The fire resulting from the collision was so high and could not be contained by both the workers on the platform and vessel and the situation forces all personnel onboard to abandon. There were three hundred and eighty-five personnel onboard when the accident happened and the death toll from this accident is put to ten workers and fourteen workers reported missing.

The major cause of this accident is high tide of the sea; this accident caused environment pollution of the aquatic life, lost of life, equipment, investment and production.

Reference
Syed.F.A (2005), ‘What really caused the ONGC fire' [online] Available at http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jul/28ongc3.htm

Tilak Suresh Kumar's picture

The incident shows the
catastrophic consequence of an oil rig fire. The unlimited supply of fuel and
oxygen normally contribute to the extremely rapid growth and spread of the
fire.

There are many questions which are still not clear about this incident:

1. As a normal practice, a multi
purpose support vessel can only engage an oil rig under normal weather
conditions. Why have they used it for medical evacuation to transport the sick personnel.

2. In addition, the incident vessel was a dynamically positioned
vessel with computer-controlled thrusters which could remain in one position on
the sea. It was still not clear why the vessel went so close to the MHN, went
out of control and hit the riser.

This issues still trigger the concerns of safety management in the offshore industry. 

ROHIT NAIR's picture

Yes Tilak I agree with your point and I understand your questions
and concerns. I will try to throw some light on those questions.

Firstly, the injury suffered by the personnel on board MSV Samudra
Suraksha was a minor one. But the master of the MSV made a judgmental error and
sought permission for personnel transfer to the platform so that the cook, who
was injured, could get better medical attention. The platform in-charge gave
the permission for transfer, which he shouldn’t have considering the weather
condition. So the vessel was brought near the platform.

Secondly, the vessel was a DNV Class 2 DP vessel with 100%
redundancy. But it was the captain’s decision to bring the ship closer in
manual mode, the reason for which is still unclear. But an investigation
carried out revealed that there was no problem with the DP system and it was
fully functional.

Rohit C Nair
Subsea Engineering
Student id- 51231896

Tilak Suresh Kumar's picture

It is evidently that the decision made by the individual with or without of knowledge of the consequences can also cause huge devastation like ONGC Mumbai High Accident. Through there are high level of safety procedures which are carried out to prevent incidents from happening but the eventuality of an incident to happen can source through any means. In this case, the decision by the platform in charge and the captain which can also be justified as a necessity to prevent an uncertainty but can also be quantified for the cause of an uncertainty.

amir masoud bayat's picture


From the articles and news I have read and my own point of
view, I believe that the main issues which contribute to Mumbai high accident
can be divided to:


Poor Safety Culture:


There are several doubts about safety certification of MHN
platform. Sea worthiness of the multi-purpose support vessel (MSV) had some
problems since during the mission of rescue, they understood that the vessel
was working on emergency thrusters and it was not working as manual thrusters.
Rescue efforts and standard operating practices have been questioned. In
addition, although there was warning for external organizations, the management
continues without enquiring further into the risk.


Riser Issues:


·        
The inappropriateness of
the position of the risers and risers guards in relation to the platform
structure


·        
The high risk to damage
even for risers inside the jacket structure


 


Vessel issues:


·        
The vulnerability of
installation


·        
The competence of crew


 


 


eddy itamah's picture

The raging fire that gutted an Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation oil-drilling platform in the Mumbai High oilfield area was
caused when an ONGC vessel MSV Samudra Suraksha sent to
pick up a sick worker on the oil rig collided with the giant platform.

It
was earlier believed that a multipurpose support vessel docked nearby
crashed into the platform due to high tide and choppy seas.

The
accident took place at 4.05 pm on Wednesday 27 July 2005 when the ONGC vessel
approached the process platform MHN (Mumbai High North) to transfer an
ill person to the platform where medical facilities are available.

It was learnt that after the medical evacuation was completed, the
vessel for some reasons, which are yet to be established, apparently
lost control and collided with the process platform, resulting in the
fire. This mishap resulted in serious oil leakage, engulfing the
platform and the vessel in a major inferno.

Meanwhile, the death toll in the huge fire is 22 with 14 people reported missing. There were 385
people onboard the platform when the incident took place. All the other 361
persons were rescued.

The
personnel, both at platform and the vessel, made efforts to control the
fire and abandoned the platform and vessel when the situation went
beyond their control.

The platform burned till the next
morning. However, the oil spill was brought under control with the
help of ONGC and Navy personnel.

The damage to Samudra Suraksha was extensive but not enough to sink it. The vessel was insured for $60 million by ONGC.

Aftermath and Investigation

MHN collapsed after around two hours, leaving only the stump of its
jacket above sea level. A total of 384 personnel were on board the MHN
complex and NCY jack-up at the time of the accident. All installations
were abandoned with 362 crew rescued and 22 reported dead (11 fatalities
with 11 missing). The flow was shut down via sub-surface ESDVs.
Significant problems were reported with the abandonment of all the
installations involved: only two of eight lifeboats and one of ten
liferafts at the complex were launched. A clean-up operation was also
undertaken after a 10 nautical mile oil spill resulted from the fire.


Two areas were identified for investigation:

  • the adequacy of and failures within the risk control systems;
  • the adequacy of collision avoidance practices and procedures.

Points of interest under investigation include the location and
vulnerability of the risers in the jacket relative to platform loading
zones. Some riser protection guards were in place just above sea level,
but these were only suitable for smaller offshore supply vessels and
were not considered suitable for larger multi-purpose support vessels.
Also under investigation is the quantity of riser contents likely to be
discharged if a riser should fail below an emergency shutdown valve and
the risk management process, including the vessel suitability, the crew
competence, communications and collision avoidance measures.

 

Reference:

http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jul/28ongc3.htm

 http://home.versatel.nl/the_sims/rig/mhn.htm


 

The Mumbai High accident was a fatal disaster that resulted in death of over 11 persons. The root cause of the accident was the rupturing of the riser by the MPS that resulted in leakage which finally lead to the explosion. A question to be raised is was there a proceedure for operating the MPS around the platform in bad weather conditions and if there was, were these proceedures followed. People working in the Industry need to be educated on the impact of failures or accident that can be prevented by their actions. Till the industry start realisizing this fact accidents like piper alpha, macondo, etc will always occur. Even with strict regulations, there is need for a change in attitude, so that people carrying out operations understand that their actions can save a soul or cause another catastrophy in the industry.

 

Uhunoma Osaigbovo,

Subsea Engineering D/L

Omololu Oyebola's picture

The Mumbai High North
Discovered in 1974, located 160km west of the Mumbai coast operated by the
India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). The Mumbai High consisted of a
processing complex, unmanned drilling platform, wellhead and residential
platform all bridge connected. [1]

The complex imported supplies
from other well head platforms and exports oil to the shore using pipelines. On
27th July 2005 a multi-purpose support vessel (MSV), Samundra
Surakha, 100m long collided with one of the gas riser. The vessel was mobilized
to the platform because the crane on the vessel was not functional.

The resulting leakage
in gas ignited immediately after, the resulting fire engulfed the platforms and
also the rig. 22 people died and over 300 were rescued.

Reports from the
accidents showed that the incident vessel was dynamically positioned using
azimuth thrusters but still moved to collide with the riser on the platform.
Poor safety culture has been noticed prior to the incidence and sea worthiness
of the MSV has been questioned, as during the rescue operation it was found
that the vessels  was working on
emergency thrusters rather than the manuals.

Recommendations

Production companies
should do a proper vessel inspection prior to her mobilization.

Vessel crew competence
should be as important as the operation itself

Sources:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombay_High

http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/project/research/structures/strucfire/CaseStudy/HistoricFires/Other/default.htm

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